Importance The research focuses on disputable issues of the strategic regulation of the transaction sector and service sector, as a whole. Objectives The aim is to formulate proposals for an effective policy of the strategic regulation of the service sector, assuming a growing importance of transaction industries for the contemporary post-industrial society. Methods I apply versatile methods of scientific analysis, and elements of institutional and evolutionary approaches. Results I systematize distinctive aspects of comprehensive transaction policies of the State that are called to reduce weighted transaction costs and optimize the process of transacting and supplying resources to agents of the economic system, and make it different from industrial policies. The article presents approaches to strategic regulation of the transaction sector in line with the complex and fuzzy structure of transaction industries. Conclusions and Relevance This article is the first to pronounce the need in the strategic regulation of the transaction sector through a special governmental policy. I reviewed macroeconomic literature on transaction costs and found that scholars and practitioners pursue reducing the cost of interactions in the economy, rather than focus on the policy of a variety and specifics of services delivered by the respective industries. There is not a sufficient and appropriate theoretical framework for analyzing the transaction sector as a target of the strategic regulation. The article presents principles of the effective policy for regulating the transaction sector. I propose the most reasonable organizational formats for implementing the interactive regulation of the transaction sector.
Keywords: economic policy, transaction sector, service sector, industry, strategic regulation
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