Finance and Credit

The role of the Bank of Russia in risk management of insurance companies

Vol. 24, Iss. 3, MARCH 2018

Received: 27 December 2017

Received in revised form: 24 January 2018

Accepted: 8 February 2018

Available online: 29 March 2018

Subject Heading: Insurance

JEL Classification: G22

Pages: 679—690

Larionov A.V. National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation

ORCID id: 0000-0001-8657-6809

Subject The article investigates the reasons for license withdrawal from Russian insurance companies.
Objectives The study aims to highlight major factors impacting the stability of insurance companies in Russia and consider opportunities of the Bank of Russia to influence the insurance market development.
Methods The Russian regulatory and legal framework for insurance market regulation and supervision served as a source of analysis. Initial computation involved binary and linear regressions.
Results The study reveals focal points of the Bank of Russia policy for insurance market development. I analyze major determinants of insurance companies' success. The study confirms the assumption that insurance companies in Russia are mostly affected by risks associated with insurance, rather than investing activities. However, in the event of investment potential development, this source of risk is also significant enough.
Conclusions The Bank of Russia needs to monitor the activities of insurance companies. It is necessary to build a model to predict violations of financial stability of insurance companies and pre-emptively identify and support the most vulnerable insurance companies.

Keywords: insurance, risks, insurance companies, financial stability, regulator, Bank of Russia


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