Importance The article focuses on issues of ensuring the competitiveness in placing State defense orders and purchasing spare parts needed for products of the Russian defense industry. Objectives The research formulates the policy of order placement and pricing for purchased products, which would sustain the competition among suppliers and, ultimately, minimize the procurement costs in the long run. Methods To optimize procurement policies of customers for the defense industry products and spare parts, we propose a new economic and mathematic model of bilateral oligopoly with the random ultimate number of sellers and buyers. Results Based on the proposed model, we made parametric computations using the model coefficients applicable to the aviation industry. We estimated the minimum price, which customers expect from competitive suppliers to ensure the competition in the long run. Conclusions and Relevance The strict procurement policy, which reduces customers' costs, will overwhelm competition in the strategic prospects, with the minimum procurement prices being attainable when the asking price exceeds the breakeven point. We make a nontrivial conclusion that the expected procurement price can reduce because the stable number of orders enables a lot of competing suppliers to work productively and gain profit.
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